QatarEnergy is developing a sophisticated business strategy, including trading and international sourcing of LNG, making a swift diversification in response to the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz
In October, QatarEnergy signed a 20-year agreement with Australia’s Woodside, for supply from its US project to purchase 3mn tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) per year, and two agreements with Cheniere Energy of the US, for up to 4mn tonnes per year up to 2054 through its Corpus Christi and Sabine Pass LNG plants. HE Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, the chief executive of QatarEnergy, said that there is ‘more to come’. On November 6, Reuters reported that QatarEnergy was in advanced talks to buy up to 2mn tonnes per year from NextDecade’s proposed Rio Grande LNG Train 6 in Texas, which has yet to reach a final investment decision.
The announcements mark a major strategic shift towards diversification of supply and a portfolio business model following the collapse of income resulting from this year’s conflict in the Gulf.
Securing supply from the US can generate a profit margin that arises from the difference between European and US prices. Also, prices have risen this year owing to the squeeze on supplies. HE al-Kaabi said this purchasing strategy requires no new capital expenditure, unlike building pipelines. Moreover, pipelines can be targeted in a conflict.
QatarEnergy uses a fleet of specialist LNG carriers, including vessels under long-term charter, which is due to be expanded to 200 vessels, and this vertical integration is an asset in this context.
The Qatar economy has been significantly affected by the war this year causing periodic closures, or near-closures, of shipping transit through the Strait of Hormuz. It is more reliant on liquefied natural gas (LNG), for which there is no readily available alternative export route at comparable scale. Some other GCC nations have alternative export routes. QatarEnergy wishes to fulfil as many contractual terms as possible, to retain confidence in long-term customers. It has had to cite ‘force majeure’ clauses in some contracts, as a consequence of this year’s war.
While deliveries from the new US deals will not commence until 2030 and 2031, QatarEnergy Trading had also bought 33 spot LNG cargoes by July of this year to help keep Asian customers supplied. This compares with just four cargoes in the whole of 2025.
And QatarEnergy already has a US investment, the Golden Pass joint venture with ExxonMobil. The first cargo was in April 2026, and the project comprises three trains, with a combined capacity of 18mn tonnes per year when fully operational.
Another source of export earnings is through using domestically produced natural gas to generate electricity, which can then be transmitted by cable to the GCC grid, although existing electricity trade is small.
The country’s principal LNG production site, Ras Laffan, had two trains damaged and put out of action in a missile strike in March. This reduced capacity by 17%, but repairs are ongoing. The restriction on export volumes is far greater than the loss of production capacity. LNG exports were down by almost 90% between April and September compared with the same period in 2025, and storage was becoming a concern. It will take around three years for the two damaged trains to be returned to full capacity.
Bloomberg estimated lost sales at around $1bn for each week Ras Laffan was not exporting, and the IMF’s October outlook projects the real GDP of Qatar to contract by 15.6% in 2026 compared with 2025.
The moves towards diversified supply are both tactical and strategic. The purchase of spot contracts secures revenues to partially replace this year’s plummeting income, and helps keep customers supplied. The new long-term US agreements do not automatically replace supplies under existing contracts, which specify origins and destinations. These deals and the strategic US partnerships represent a long-term move towards a portfolio business model, similar to that of oil giants such as Shell.
QatarEnergy Trading, established in 2020, is a key part of this development. The company is equally committed to restarting supplies through the Gulf. An attack on a Qatari tanker in July prompted a pause in shipments, but in September an older vessel exporting LNG from Qatar, successfully passed through the Strait before transferring the cargo to a newer vessel. Older ships are used owing to the huge cost of replacing a new ship, around $300mn, resulting in very high insurance premiums. Crews have had to be offered around twice or three times their usual pay. Around 20 tankers carrying Qatari LNG passed through in the four weeks following the first crossing, with deliveries approaching one third of pre-war levels by late September.
Attacks in the Strait by Iranian forces have continued, however. On November 5, the Joint Maritime Information Centre reported four attacks in the Strait over a 96-hour period, compared with three in the previous reporting period. Separately, the Qatari LNG carrier Al Mayeda, bound for Pakistan, was attacked on October 30 despite reportedly having received Iranian clearance. Qatar said investigations were under way to identify those responsible.
QatarEnergy anticipates that production could resume at around 83% of pre-war levels within a week of a peace deal, provided ships are available, but the diversification towards global sourcing and LNG trading will help build continuity of earnings and reduce exposure to geopolitical disruption.
n The author is a Qatari banker, with many years of experience in the banking sector in senior positions.
