Opinion

Monday, December 22, 2025 | Daily Newspaper published by GPPC Doha, Qatar.
Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva: ambitious plans

Brazil's bold industrial turn

For many in the developing world, Brazil is a rare beacon of hope in an otherwise bleak global landscape. Along with his South African counterpart, Cyril Ramaphosa, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is among the few world leaders who have stood up to US President Donald Trump with dignity and a measure of success.Brazil has succeeded in reversing some of Trump’s most punitive measures, despite lacking the bargaining power of countries like China. The 40% tariff he imposed on Brazilian agricultural exports, for example, was quietly rolled back without any concessions from Brazil. Likewise, the absurd US sanctions against Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who presided over the conviction of former President Jair Bolsonaro, were lifted without fanfare.At a time when many governments around the world are retreating from their climate commitments, Brazil is doubling down on decarbonisation. Since returning to office, Lula has accelerated efforts to curb deforestation and announced plans to triple renewable capacity and double energy efficiency by 2030.Even in what many regard as a less ambitious third term, and despite being constrained by strong opposition in Congress, Lula’s administration has launched several important reforms. Most notably, it has simplified the Brazilian tax system and addressed some of its most regressive features, although much remains to be done to make it genuinely progressive.Lula’s industrial policy, launched in early 2024, marks a clear departure from the market-led approach that has dominated recent economic policymaking, offering in its place a mission-oriented reindustrialisation programme structured around six priority areas. Beyond strengthening agro-industrial supply chains through increased mechanisation, the programme seeks to increase the share of domestically produced drugs, vaccines, and medical equipment in national consumption, and to improve urban well-being through investment in sustainable infrastructure, sanitation, and mobility.The programme also seeks to accelerate the digitalisation of productive enterprises and boost the technological capabilities in emerging sectors, and aims to reduce carbon emissions by 30% by the end of 2026 through greater reliance on biofuels – a strategy that raises its own set of concerns.Finally, Lula’s industrial policy signals a major shift in Brazil’s national-security strategy. To boost self-sufficiency in defence production, the administration has set an ambitious target of producing half of the country’s critical defence technologies domestically.Lula plans to advance these priorities through a combination of public and private investment, including approximately R$300bn ($54bn) in government spending over three years. The reindustrialisation programme also relies on strategic public procurement to incentivise domestic production and sourcing, along with special credit lines, regulatory reforms, and changes to intellectual-property laws.On the surface, macroeconomic conditions look favourable, even amid global uncertainty and US tariff pressures. Unemployment has declined to 5.4%, inflation has fallen below 4.5%, and Brazil continues to run a trade surplus, even though the current-account deficit stands at around 2.5% of GDP. Moreover, the country has almost no foreign-currency debt.Even so, many economists remain deeply pessimistic about Brazil’s economic outlook. At a recent economic conference in Sao Paulo, few believed that the premature deindustrialisation that has marked the Brazilian economy over the past few decades could be reversed.That pessimism has far less to do with external conditions than with monetary and fiscal policy. Brazil’s benchmark interest rate, the Selic, is among the highest in the world, at 15% – and that’s merely the base rate from which other interest rates are derived. The country’s real interest rate, at 9.4%, is second only to Turkiye’s. Given how difficult it is to imagine any private investment projects being viable at such levels, it is hardly surprising that Brazil’s investment rate has remained stubbornly low, at around 18% of GDP.High interest rates persist not because they are economically rational, but because of political choices. Since the early 2000s, successive progressive governments have entered into a Faustian bargain with private banks and financial investors, tolerating exceptionally high returns in exchange for the political and financial stability needed to pursue limited progressive social policies. The fact that a significant share of Brazil’s public debt is held by non-residents, even though it is denominated in reais, further intensifies fears of capital flight.With few controls on cross-border capital flows, exchange-rate policy is often used to curb inflation by limiting import-price pressures. But the combination of high interest rates and currency appreciation also erodes the competitiveness of Brazilian firms and discourages precisely the kind of productive investment that the government’s new industrial policy intends to stimulate.High interest rates also place a heavy burden on public finances. Interest payments on debt have accounted for between one-quarter and one-third of total public expenditure over the past decade – an extraordinarily high share, particularly given that Brazil’s public debt, at around 85% of GDP, is modest by international standards. Brazil now allocates roughly 6% of GDP to servicing its debt, more than any other G20 country. By contrast, Japan, with a public debt of 252% of GDP, spends only 0.1% of GDP on interest, while even debt-stressed Argentina – whose debt amounts to 154% of GDP – pays just 2.4%.Such self-imposed constraints are not merely the result of political bargains. They also reflect the restrictions on domestic policy autonomy that come with exposure to global capital markets. In this sense, Brazil offers yet another revealing example of how financial globalisation has undermined the development objectives of middle-income countries. - Project Syndicate. Jayati Ghosh, Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, is a member of the Club of Rome’s Transformational Economics Commission and Co-Chair of the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation

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How to build an effective sovereign borrowers’ club

One of the most promising ideas in the Seville Commitment (Compromiso de Sevilla), which heads of state and government adopted in July, is the creation of a platform for borrower countries, supported by existing institutions and facilitated by a United Nations secretariat. This simple but potentially transformative concept could shift the balance of information and influence, which has long favoured creditors. By allowing borrower countries to discuss technical issues and debt challenges, access capacity-building assistance, and co-ordinate their actions, the platform would amplify their voice in the global financial system.While creditor co-ordination has long been institutionalised – through the Paris Club, the London Club, and industry-led efforts such as the Institute of International Finance – borrower countries have often been discouraged from sharing information, leading to ad hoc exchanges. Establishing a borrowers’ club is therefore a political signal: it recognises that enabling the Global South to speak with one voice can benefit financial stability. Whether such a platform becomes a durable institution will depend on its members’ ability to translate rhetoric into practical co-operation.This is not the first attempt at borrower co-ordination, and lessons should be drawn from past efforts, which began during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and other countries in the region explored forming a “debtors’ club,” supported at the time by UN Trade and Development and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.The result was the Cartagena Group, formed in June 1984 by 11 Latin American countries accounting for 75% of regional debt. The group highlighted the external origins of the crisis – including then-US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker’s interest-rate hikes – and argued for shared debtor-creditor responsibility and debt workouts that focused more on socioeconomic development than austerity. Their proposals were sent to the 1984 G7 leaders’ summit in London, only to be rejected in favour of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank’s case-by-case approach based on financial programming.Subsequent attempts have faced similar barriers: Africa’s Committee of Ten initially influenced international institutions’ approach after the 2008 global financial crisis, but has since faded in prominence. More recent initiatives, such as the Sustainable Debt Coalition, established during the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference in Egypt, and proposals by the V20 Group (which represents the world’s most climate-vulnerable countries), have linked debt to climate breakdown, but remain fragmented.Meanwhile, many developing countries’ debt burden has become more onerous. The proliferation of lenders has made creditor co-ordination more difficult, and simultaneous external shocks – including capital flight, slow global growth, and trade disruptions – have further eroded borrowers’ fiscal space.During Europe’s post-2008 sovereign-debt crisis, the inadequacy of existing tools led to the creation of new institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism. No such innovations exist for developing countries.Of course, the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) offered temporary relief for low-income countries during the pandemic, but private and multilateral creditors largely did not participate, limiting its impact. And while the G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatments was designed to provide relief to countries in debt distress, only Zambia, Chad, Ghana, and Ethiopia have used the mechanism for debt restructuring, with others citing concerns about timeliness and outcomes.The IMF-World Bank Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable has identified promising strategies to address liquidity challenges – including a more flexible “three-pillar approach” that combines reform, financing, and restructuring – but implementation remains slow.These piecemeal initiatives, which have largely disappointed, should inform the design of a borrowers’ club under the Seville Commitment. The governance structure must accommodate diverse debt profiles and complex political realities, and the funding model must guarantee institutional independence and protect decision-making from creditor influence. The secretariat must be capable of generating credible data and countering misperceptions that inflate borrowing costs for developing countries. There must also be co-ordination mechanisms to ensure effective alignment with the newly created Seville Forum on Debt.Such a club should not be a confrontational bloc, but rather a mechanism for mutual capacity-building in four main areas. First, debt restructuring must emphasise preserving market access. Many countries avoid the Common Framework (like the DSSI before it) and even precautionary IMF programmes because they fear rating downgrades and negative market reactions. Borrowers need stronger communication strategies to present credible macroeconomic programmes and provide consistent, evidence-based messaging to rating agencies and private creditors.Second, long-run sustainable growth must be integrated into financial programming, as required by the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable’s three-pillar approach. Given that current models do not capture climate-transition risks or opportunities, borrowers need shared analytical tools that allow them to articulate credible, comparable, and climate-aligned growth strategies.Third, capital for restructuring must support high-quality, externally validated investment programme and be paired with mechanisms that ensure timely, predictable disbursement – long-standing weaknesses for many developing countries.Lastly, debt transparency must be improved. The World Bank advocates “radical transparency,” but many countries struggle to operationalise this in debt-management practices. A borrowers’ club could help standardise templates, disclosure protocols, and peer-review processes tailored to developing-country contexts.Some progress has been made toward alleviating the developing world’s debt crisis: financial contagion is now less common in these countries; pause clauses provide liquidity after shocks; and official lenders have been extending maturities and lowering surcharges, especially for climate-related investments. But to achieve debt sustainability, borrower countries need a greater say in shaping these instruments, promoting fairer risk-sharing, and ensuring sovereign-finance innovations support development and climate goals.To seize this opportunity, Global South countries and international financial institutions must build on the momentum of the Seville Commitment, the UN Expert Group on Debt report published in June, and the recent reference to enhancing the voice of borrower countries at the G20 leaders’ summit in South Africa. Institutionalising borrower representation is a necessary step toward rebalancing the global financial architecture and improving sovereign-debt resolution. — Project Syndicate• Homi Kharas is a senior fellow at the Center for Sustainable Development at the Brookings Institution.• Mahmoud Mohieldin, UN Special Envoy on Financing Sustainable Development and Co-Chair of the UN Secretary-General’s Expert Group on Debt, is a former minister of investment of Egypt (2004-10), former senior vice-president of the World Bank Group, former executive director of the International Monetary Fund, and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.