In regional geopolitics, neutrality has traditionally been viewed as a form of protection. States that avoid direct involvement in conflicts or position themselves as mediators are generally expected to face fewer risks of being exposed to military action. Recent developments in the Gulf, however, challenge this assumption. Instead of shielding countries from harm, neutrality has proven insufficient to prevent them from becoming targets. After being attacked by the United States and Israel, Iran decided to direct part of its retaliatory missile and drone strikes beyond its direct adversaries to include states that neither attacked it nor allowed their territories to be used for military operations against it. This shift raises a fundamental question: what value does neutrality hold if escalation disregards political positioning?**media[424656]**The current war has not been confined to a single battlefield or set of direct combatants. Instead, its impact and trajectory immediately stretched across a wide regional landscape that included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, as well as Jordan, Iraq, and later Lebanon. In effect, the conflict operated less as a conventional interstate war than as a regionalized system of pressure. For Gulf countries, in particular, which sought to remain outside the scope of confrontation, this outcome has produced a new strategic reality: that sustained diplomatic effort and deliberate non-involvement can no longer be relied upon to shield them from conflict. Equally troubling is the nature of the sites affected. Iranian officials have framed the strikes as defensive military responses to perceived threats. Yet numerous targeted locations were civilian or economic facilities rather than traditional military installations. Airports, ports, hotels, and residential areas have been among the impacted sites. When civilian infrastructure becomes entangled in strategic signaling or weaponized to escalate costs, the character of the conflict changes. Military confrontation begins to overlap with economic disruption and social pressure, amplifying its broader consequences. This pattern suggests that Iran’s objectives may extend beyond immediate retaliation. By demonstrating that escalation can reverberate across a wide geographic area, Tehran appears to be signaling that any confrontation involving it will inevitably affect the broader region. In this framework, neighbouring countries become indirect participants in a conflict they did not initiate. Such a strategy spreads the political and psychological costs of escalation beyond the primary belligerents. The situation is particularly striking because several Gulf states had, prior to the war, been pursuing policies of de-escalation, both directly with Iran and between Iran and the US. Over the past decade, governments in the region invested considerable diplomatic effort in maintaining communication channels and reducing tensions. Oman has long served as a discreet intermediary in sensitive diplomatic exchanges between Tehran and Washington, helping facilitate dialogue during moments of crisis. Doha has similarly engaged in mediation and crisis management, maintaining relationships across rival political blocs in an effort to encourage dialogue rather than confrontation. Despite the latest challenges, the situation should not be interpreted as evidence of Gulf vulnerability. The region has demonstrated considerable defensive capability. Advanced air defence systems and integrated early-warning networks have enabled Gulf states to intercept nearly all incoming missiles and drones. These capabilities are the result of decades of investment in military modernization and security infrastructure. Their performance during the recent attacks reflects both preparedness and effective operational co-ordination. However, defensive success does not eliminate the broader strategic dilemma posed by repeated threats. Continued attacks on civilian or economic infrastructure could eventually prompt governments to reconsider their current posture. The issue is not only the immediate damage caused by individual strikes but also the longer-term implications for perceptions of security and sovereignty. For years, many Gulf states pursued a dual strategy combining diplomacy with deterrence. Dialogue with regional rivals was paired with sustained investments in defensive capabilities, allowing governments to reduce tensions while preserving readiness for potential threats. Yet the current crisis risks weakening the diplomatic component of this balance. If neutrality and mediation no longer reduce exposure to military pressure, regional actors may begin reassessing the assumptions guiding their foreign and security policies. Ultimately, the consequences of the escalation may extend beyond the immediate military dimension. Iran’s effort to demonstrate its ability to respond across multiple arenas may project strength in the short term. Yet by imposing the costs of conflict on neighbouring states—including those that had pursued engagement—Tehran risks undermining relationships that once provided diplomatic space to manage tensions. Khalid Al-Jaber, Ph.D, is Executive Director, Middle East Council on Global Affairs
Thursday, March 12, 2026
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