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For decades, the global commercial aircraft market has effectively been a duopoly. Airbus and Boeing have dominated the narrowbody and widebody segments, supplying the fleets that underpin global air travel. China’s state-backed planemaker, Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, known as COMAC, is now attempting to insert itself into that structure in a meaningful way. The C919, its narrowbody jet designed to compete with the Airbus A320neo and Boeing 737 Max, is no longer a concept or a mock-up. It is in commercial service, flying passengers within China and gradually expanding its operational footprint. That shift alone makes this more than a symbolic industrial project.The C919 sits squarely in the most commercially important segment of the market. Single-aisle aircraft account for the vast majority of global deliveries and are the workhorses of short- and medium-haul travel. In capacity terms, the C919 typically seats between 158 and 174 passengers depending on configuration, placing it directly alongside the A320neo and 737 Max families. Its advertised range supports dense domestic routes and regional services across Asia. From a strategic standpoint, China has chosen the correct battlefield. If a new manufacturer is to challenge the incumbents, it must do so in the segment that generates the highest volume and the deepest orderbooks.Yet the C919 is not an entirely indigenous aircraft. Its engine, the LEAP-1C, is supplied by CFM International, the long-established joint venture between GE Aerospace in the United States and Safran in France. The engine core shares lineage with the LEAP variants powering the A320neo and 737 Max. Key avionics systems are sourced from Western suppliers, including Honeywell and Collins Aerospace. Flight control computers, landing gear systems, fuel systems and other critical components reflect a similar pattern. The aircraft may be assembled and designed in China, but its technological architecture remains embedded in a global supply chain dominated by US and European firms.This structure reflects pragmatism rather than weakness. Using established Western systems allowed COMAC to accelerate development and reduce technical risk in early stages. It also ensured compliance with international safety standards that airlines understand. At the same time, reliance on foreign suppliers introduces vulnerability. Export controls, geopolitical tensions and regulatory disputes could all disrupt supply. The long-term ambition of China’s aerospace strategy is clear: Reduce dependency on foreign technology and build a self-sufficient industrial base, including a domestically produced engine that could eventually replace the LEAP-1C. For now, that goal remains aspirational rather than operational.Operationally, the C919 entered service with China Eastern Airlines in 2023 and has since been deployed on high-frequency domestic routes. Air China and China Southern have also placed orders, reinforcing the state-backed demand base that underpins the programme. China’s domestic aviation market offers a controlled environment in which to refine the aircraft. Trunk routes between cities such as Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou provide consistent, high-density utilisation, allowing engineers and operators to gather performance data at scale.Production remains modest compared with Airbus and Boeing. The established manufacturers deliver hundreds of narrowbody aircraft annually, supported by deeply integrated supplier networks and decades of ramp-up experience. COMAC’s current output is far lower, though it has signalled ambitions to increase production substantially over the coming years. Scaling from dozens to hundreds of aircraft per year requires more than assembly capacity. It demands consistent supplier performance, robust quality control, and a support infrastructure capable of meeting airline dispatch reliability standards.Certification is another critical frontier. The C919 has been certified by China’s Civil Aviation Administration, enabling domestic operations. It does not yet hold certification from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency or the US Federal Aviation Administration. Without those approvals, international expansion is constrained. Airlines outside China are unlikely to commit significant fleet investment in an aircraft that lacks broad regulatory acceptance. Securing Western certification would require extensive data sharing and regulatory cooperation, which in turn intersects with political considerations.State support has been central to the programme’s progress. Orders from Chinese carriers provide a guaranteed customer base, insulating COMAC from immediate commercial pressure. That backing, however, complicates external perceptions. In global aviation, fleet decisions are typically driven by lifecycle economics, residual value expectations and financing flexibility. For the C919 to compete internationally, it must demonstrate that it can match Airbus and Boeing not only on purchase price, but on long-term operating cost, maintenance predictability and asset value retention.Airbus and Boeing benefit from established ecosystems that include leasing companies, maintenance networks and secondary market liquidity. Lessors play a pivotal role in fleet planning worldwide, and their appetite for a new aircraft type depends on confidence in remarketing prospects and global demand. Until the C919 proves its reliability and gains wider certification, its appeal beyond China’s borders will remain limited.The competitive implications are therefore medium to long-term rather than immediate. Airbus and Boeing hold backlogs stretching years into the future, particularly in the narrowbody segment. Airlines continue to face delivery constraints and extended wait times. In that context, a third supplier with meaningful production capacity could eventually reshape bargaining dynamics. The immediate reality is that COMAC is building credibility domestically while the incumbents continue to dominate internationally.Geopolitics adds a further dimension. Aviation has always been strategic, tied to national industrial policy and technological prestige. The emergence of a Chinese manufacturer reflects broader ambitions to reduce reliance on Western technology across critical sectors. For Western governments, this introduces questions about supply chain resilience, export controls and competitive policy. For airlines, the calculation remains commercial: Reliability, cost and operational compatibility.COMAC’s longer-term portfolio includes ambitions beyond the C919. The proposed CR929 widebody programme, initially developed in co-operation with Russia, has encountered delays and uncertainty amid geopolitical tensions. The narrowbody segment remains the practical starting point. Success there would provide the production base, engineering experience and financial platform necessary to contemplate expansion into larger aircraft categories.Whether COMAC ultimately becomes a structural rival to Airbus and Boeing will depend less on symbolic milestones and more on sustained execution. Production stability, component localisation, regulatory acceptance and operational reliability will define its trajectory. The C919 represents tangible progress in China’s aerospace ambitions, but it remains embedded in a global industrial framework it has yet to replace.For now, the global market remains anchored by the established duopoly. The C919 introduces a third pole with domestic depth and strategic backing. Transforming that position into genuine global parity will require years of consistent performance and trust-building across airlines and regulators alike. The ambition is evident. The competitive outcome will depend on whether that ambition can be matched by industrial maturity.The author is an aviation analyst. X handle: @AlexInAir. 

Etihad Airways is exploring a novel way to get around persistent supply bottlenecks that have long bedevilled the aviation industry: buying components like seats in bulk and then storing them in a local warehouse until they’re needed.The Abu Dhabi flag carrier is undertaking a $1bn retrofit of its existing fleet because new aircraft are delayed. But matching the delivery of seats among the most complex cabin elements with the upgrade cycle of a plane could quickly prove impossible given suppliers have been notoriously unreliable in sticking to their schedules, Etihad Chief Executive Officer Antonoaldo Neves said.“I cannot just park five, six, seven planes and destroy my network just to retrofit the planes, it’s going to be too expensive,” Neves said in an interview in New York. “We say, look, give me all the seats to retrofit about 50 planes in three months and I store the seats, and use them when it doesn’t hurt my network to pull those planes out of service.”Etihad’s considerations show how the aviation industry is trying to navigate one of the biggest impediments to growth: slow delivery of aircraft. Airbus SE and Boeing Co have for years struggled to get their production lines back on track, held back by component shortages and quality lapses on the factory floors. That’s forcing carriers to fly older kit for longer and requiring costly maintenance or cabin upgrades to keep the jets fresh.Customers are still waiting for new jets like the Boeing 777X that is half a decade behind schedule. Airbus has also had trouble meeting delivery goals, while Boeing has started improving output again after years of upheaval.Emirates is spending $5bn refurbishing existing jets like the jumbo Airbus A380 and the Boeing 777 to bridge delays with new models on order, particularly from the US manufacturer. Those overhauls have also been tied up by delayed parts availability, forcing airlines to ground a number of aircraft, cancel flights or charter short-term capacity.Touching up the cabins with new seats has become an important marketing tool for carriers, particularly as more travellers migrate to more expensive seats like premium economy or business class. While economy class bookings are slower in some markets, Etihad is seeing continued demand for premium travel in key geographies such as the US, Europe and Middle East. That makes it harder for the airline to stand down planes, Neves said.Neves said it’s not just supply bottlenecks holding back output. Certification requirements by authorities like the Federal Aviation Administration and its counterpart, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, are also causing delays that are increasingly affecting growth plans.“Certification has not improved, it’s a frustration,” Neves said. “Everything’s taking too long, we don’t have time for that, the customer cannot wait.”The airline reported record profit of 1.1bn dirhams ($306mn) for the first half of the year, driven by both passenger and cargo demand. While state-owned Etihad is ready for an initial public offering, the decision of whether and when to go public is in the hands of the shareholder, Neves said.As part of its plan to cash in on the continued demand for premium flying, the airline is bringing back two more Airbus A380 double decker jets, Neves said. The Etihad aircraft features the so-called Residence, a three-room layout featuring a double bed, living area and shower cubicle.Etihad had previously planned to permanently retire the four-engined behemoth for smaller, more nimble planes but now already has seven back in service. The airline has shifted the aircraft to Toronto from New York because of capacity constraints at that location, though Neves said he’d like to return the A380 to US destinations eventually.The national carrier expects to almost double its fleet to 200 aircraft in the next four or five years, Neves said. Still, the airline doesn’t plan on placing mega fleet orders, and will instead pursue small aircraft purchases as and when it needs them, the CEO said.The airline doesn’t expect the exit of Wizz Air Holdings Plc from Abu Dhabi to impact traffic into its main hub. Neves said that other airlines, including its venture with Air Arabia PJSC, will add more than twice the traffic into the airport than Wizz is pulling out.