The dollar's surge, propelled by strong US economic data, a hawkish Federal Reserve, and surging bond yields, is gathering momentum. An increasingly interventionist US Treasury will not welcome this — and it’s a reminder that for market actions to work, governments need to be willing to go big. The dollar fell 10% last year, its worst year since 2017, and was widely expected to continue that trajectory this year. At the end of January it was languishing at a four-year low. But it has rebounded 6% since then, with momentum now accelerating sharply. Further appreciation looks likely. As HSBC analysts put it on Wednesday, "the dollar has been ‘freed from debasement’." The rally pours cold water on the "dollar debasement" narrative sparked last year. Foreign investors are clearly not turning against the greenback. That might be welcome news in the White House, but the shift also undercuts some of the Trump administration's key economic goals, including reviving American manufacturing and narrowing the enormous trade deficit, which revolve around a more competitive exchange rate. Moreover, one of the key drivers of the move — spiking bond yields — is the exact opposite of what the Treasury is aiming for. This all calls into question the interventionist methods in the currency and bond markets that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has resorted to this year. In late July, the Treasury acted alongside Japanese authorities to cool the dollar's sizzling strength against the yen. Three weeks later, Bessent zeroed in on long-term US borrowing costs, announcing that the Treasury would increase the size of scheduled buybacks of long-duration debt, a move most observers saw as an effort to lower the yields on these bonds. Both of these ventures were proudly trumpeted by Bessent, who later boasted, "I have asymmetric information. I am the house now... You can bet against me if you want." Well, investors are betting against him. The yen is now right back in the "intervention zone" near 160 per dollar. Meanwhile, long-dated Treasury yields are at their highest in 22 years. The harsh truth is that trying to impose your will on the $30 tn US Treasury market and $10 trillion-a-day global foreign exchange (FX) market is not so easy. Some government interventions over the decades have been successful. Their primary lessons are that words have to be backed by overwhelming force, the scale needs to be enormous, and, quite often, the moves need to be multilateral. In the 1980s, the world's most powerful central banks sought to weaken the overvalued dollar. The "Plaza Accord” of 1985 delivered the huge dollar depreciation they wanted, a slide so strong it required the "Louvre Accord” two years later to slow it down. Similarly, coordinated intervention to support the fledgling euro in late 2000 marked what is still the currency's all-time low. When trying to manage government borrowing costs via quantitative easing (QE), size, force, and credibility are key. This QE policy was first used by the Bank of Japan in the early 2000s and then by the Fed in response to the global financial crisis. It worked, but it took trillions of dollars and yen as well as the clear message that more would be forthcoming if necessary. In a similar vein, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi's unscripted promise at the height of the euro zone debt crisis in July 2012 to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro was successful largely because markets believed he meant it. Huge bouts of QE followed. By comparison, the US Treasury's recent actions are minute specks on the intervention landscape. Of course, they aren't intended to be comparable. They're designed to tackle pockets of market illiquidity and unwanted volatility, according to Bessent. But even if that’s true, their small size means their chances of achieving anything more than a temporary fix are slim. So after Bessent proclaimed that he could bring multi-trillion-dollar markets to heel with small actions, the Treasury is now facing the highest borrowing costs in decades and a resurgent dollar. "The biggest impediment to buying the dollar was fear of debasement. The biggest impediment to selling the dollar is (attractive) nominal and real rate differentials," Steven Englander at Standard Chartered said on Wednesday. The dollar 'debasement' narrative had traction earlier this year when the greenback was at a four-year trough and hurtling lower. But the extraordinary rebound in the expected path for US interest rates has nixed that. Debasement fears, such as they are, appear to be centered on US bonds. Perhaps "the house" doesn’t always win.The opinions expressed here are those of Jamie McGeever, a columnist for Reuters.
