Hailed as a partial solution to Metro Manila’s crippling traffic congestion and proof of the success of the Duterte administration’s Build, Build, Build infrastructure drive, the Skyway Stage 3 and Skyway Stage 4 projects might actually worsen traffic problems.
A careful analysis of both projects and the growth patterns of the metropolis reveals that the construction of the Skyway Stage 3, and likely the Stage 4 project as well, has worsened traffic congestion. This was anticipated to some extent, but delays and design changes have made the problem worse.
Even when completed, the new highways may not significantly reduce congestion because they do not connect areas in and around Metro Manila where growth is greatest.
Legal issues and extraordinary cost overruns associated with the Skyway Stage 3 project may result in greater scrutiny of upcoming project contracts, potentially delaying the launch of new construction at a time when President Rodrigo Duterte’s administration is trying to accelerate the pace of infrastructure development.
The Metro Manila Skyway (MMS) Stage 3 project was originally conceived as a 14.8-kilometre, six-lane elevated highway connecting the South Expressway at Buendia in Makati City with Balintawak in Quezon City. The P26.5bn project was proposed under a public-private partnership by the former Aquino 3rd administration. A joint venture called the Citra Central Expressway Corp. (CCEC), comprised of San Miguel Holdings Corp. (SMHC), the Philippine National Construction Corp. and Indonesia’s Citra Group, won the 30-year concession to build and operate it in January 2012.
The project was bogged down with delays from the very beginning. Construction was supposed to start in January 2014, but did not get underway until nearly four months later, with very little of the highway being completed by its planned mid-2016 opening date. Design changes necessitated by right-of-way disputes and a decision to extend the highway across Edsa to the North Luzon Expressway-Balintawak interchange in Quezon City lengthened the original design by 2.58km, and drove costs far beyond the original P26.5bn price tag to P37.43bn by mid-2017. In February this year, an official of San Miguel disclosed that costs had ballooned beyond P46bn.
As of early September, according to Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary Mark Villar, the project was only about 75% complete, more than three years beyond its original target date, and securing of the right-of-way for the highway is only “almost 100% complete.” Villar said the highway would be partially open by the end of this year, with one lane available for traffic in either direction, and that the project will be fully completed by the first quarter of 2020.
If construction delays and enormous cost overruns were not enough, the Skyway Stage 3 project is also at the centre of an ownership dispute between the principal partners in the project, SMHC and the Citra Group (Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada), a conglomerate controlled by the eldest daughter of the late Indonesian dictator Suharto. 
SMHC has accused the Indonesian group of fraud in creating CCEC, and in September 2018 the Justice department approved the filing of syndicated estafa charges against Shadik Wahono, the head of the Indonesian firm, three other Indonesians and two Filipinos.
Wahono, who along with his co-accused is the subject of a no-bail arrest warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong, has since disappeared and the case remains stalled. Because the heart of the dispute is control over the joint venture, it could have serious implications for the contract arrangements of many large-scale infrastructure projects that have foreign investors.
The Southeast Metro Manila Expressway, otherwise known as the Skyway Stage 4, is a P45bn, six-lane tollroad, approximately 34km in length, that will connect the South Luzon Expressway near the FTI complex with the Batasan Complex in Quezon City. San Miguel is handling this project, as well, along with its problematic Indonesian partner Citra, this time under a joint venture known as Citra Intercity Tollways Inc, an arrangement that could be put at risk depending on the outcome of SMHC’s case against Citra over CCEC.
Although the official start of construction was in January 2018 — the optimistic target completion date at that time was the end of 2020 — very little work has been completed according to recent data from the DPWH. Only some pile-drilling work along the highway’s Section 1, a 2.4km section at the route’s southern end, has been accomplished.
The apparent reason for this is that a major realignment of one of the highway’s sections has become necessary. Section 2 of the project, which was supposed to be a 2.125km stretch between the C-5 at Diego Silang, Makati and the C-6 road in lower Taguig, will now take a northward loop nearly four times in length.
The design of the new route has yet to be completed, and so the estimated additional cost to the entire project is not known. Likewise, although some work can be done on other sections of the route, the redesign poses some delays in the overall construction timeline. The DPWH is no longer providing an estimate for completion of the entire highway. It expects Section 1, the shortest section, to be completed sometime in 2021.
Even when both Skyway projects are completed, they may not ease traffic congestion as much as anticipated for the simple reason that their orientation across the densely populated metropolis is entirely two-dimensional.
Both highway routes are aligned in a north-south direction; Skyway Stage 3 takes a path directly across the city near to the historic centre of Manila, while Stage 4 will add another circumferential road in the city’s eastern sections. What they do not do is contribute to faster travel in an east-west direction across the metropolis, or adding connections between the city and the nearby provinces.
The two new highways may help ease traffic on EDSA, as they both supply approximately parallel alternate routes, but not all of the city’s congestion can be found on EDSA. Travel in an east-west direction along axes such as España-Quezon Avenue-Commonwealth Avenue, Magsaysay-Aurora Boulevard and Shaw Boulevard-Ortigas Avenue will continue to be constrained by heavy traffic.
Overlooking new connections from the areas surrounding Laguna de Bay, Rizal and Bulacan provinces to the east and north fails to recognise that the Spanish-era planning bias that places Manila at the centre of development is no longer realistic. According to data published last year by the National Economic Development Authority, in terms of population, business and job growth, and in terms of regional gross domestic product growth, both the Calabarzon (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon) region and Region 3 bordering the National Capital Region are expanding faster than the National Capital Region.
The disappointing pace of progress in the Skyway Stage 3 and Stage 4 projects may also be emblematic of a perception that the Duterte administration has under-delivered on its flagship ‘Build, Build, Build’ programme. That is perhaps not entirely fair, but Duterte’s critics have been quick to use the lagging progress of the ambitious policy against him.
The shortcomings of the two large-scale highway projects in addressing traffic congestion may suggest solutions the administration can use to speed up progress and protect the president’s legacy, while substantially easing traffic congestion. Smaller transportation infrastructure projects linking the new roads, which can be designed, bid, and awarded quickly, and constructed in timeframes measured in months instead of years, could be a way to give new impetus to the ‘Build, Build, Build’ initiative, while at the same time providing practical relief to Metro Manila’s commuting population.