On November 8, 2016 Donald Trump won the US presidency. But it was also the day the Democratic party went awol.
Almost two years later, the Democrats are still not to be found.
They have no clear leader, or even leadership team, no convincing analysis of why they lost the election, and, consequently, no strategy to do better next time.
In a July 2017 Washington Post-ABC News poll a majority of Americans (52%) said the Democratic party “just stands against Trump”, while just a minority (37%) believed the party “stands for something”.
I seriously doubt these numbers will have changed much since then.
As Democratic leaders limit their interventions to anti-Russia and anti-Trump platitudes, they might rally their partisan core, but they lose the bigger base – including millennials.
Now, before you start shouting “fake news” or “uninformed voters”, do you really know what the Democratic party stands for? I don’t.
Sure, the Democratic party has always had different factions. Just like the Republican party it is a “big tent” party.
In fact, the 2016 presidential elections showed that the US has four potential main parties, forced by an unforgiving electoral system into two actual parties.
But because the Republicans hold the presidency, they have less of a problem with presenting a clear face (if not necessarily position) to the American voter.
The Democrats don’t have this luxury.
Democratic partisans will counter that, since Trump came to power, Democrats have won many of the local and state races that have been held.
But they glance over the fact that these races were won with many different candidates and positions, some diametrically opposed to each other.
Moreover, some races were won despite, rather than because of the Democratic party.
In several races the local (or national) party establishment worked against candidates they believed might scare away the “moderate Republican” – the political unicorn that was to bring Hillary Clinton the presidency.
The fact that some of these candidates, often more outspokenly leftwing and/or non-white, like my district’s representative, Deborah Gonzalez, (Georgia House district 117) nevertheless won their seat, shows how insular the party establishment is.
Does this mean that the Democratic party should embrace “identity politics – ie cater to a variety of specific identity-based groups – and “democratic socialism” to regain political power? Not necessarily.
While Andrew Cuomo ’s response to Cynthia Nixon’s much-hyped but ultimately unsuccessful primary challenge was both arrogant and petty, he was at least partly right to say that, so far, the insurgent progressive wave is “not even a ripple”, at least if he speaks with regard to the United States rather than the Democratic party.
There is little doubt that in certain parts of the country, most notably the Democratic strongholds on the coasts, so-called “democratic socialists” (read: social democrats) are successfully challenging the Democratic establishment.
Whether they can defeat both Democrats and Republicans will have to be proven in November, but it is not unlikely.
Still, while voters in the rest of the country might be ready for a liberal representative, even a non-white one, voting for a socialist might be a step too far.
This is the case, for example, in Georgia, where the Democrat Stacey Abrams takes on Republican Brian Kemp for the governorship.
Abrams, an African American woman, has her main support in the city of Atlanta, while Kemp, a white man who is channelling his inner Trump, is strongest in the white rural parts of the state, which decades of gerrymandering have given disproportionate power in Georgia politics.
Abrams is often seen as an example of “identity politics”, but this says more about the writer than the candidate.
As Briahna Gray has argued convincingly, Abrams actually represents a much more traditional Democratic position, built on a liberal agenda and a multiracial coalition.
Which is exactly why she is competitive in a state like Georgia.
Running both liberal and “socialist” candidates is the best strategy for the Democratic party at this point.
They have to cater to an increasingly polarised country, in which the polarisation is no longer just between the two parties, but also within them.
However, an electoral victory in the midterm elections can only be translated into a political victory if the two camps can find common ground that goes beyond anti-Trump platitudes.
Lacking this, they can at best hope to slow down the Republican onslaught on the political system.
Obviously, liberals and “socialists” should stop attacking each other with petty personal insults, of which the New York gubernatorial primary was a sad example.
And while it is useful to have a fundamental debate on how much redistribution is desirable, and whether we should have Obamacare or universal healthcare, we are so far away from implementing even the most modest proposals.
To do that, Democrats first have to defend the liberal democratic system, which requires a basic agenda that can be supported by both camps within the Democratic party as well as the (fast-decreasing) section of liberal democratic Republicans.
At the very least, this agenda should include three types of reforms.
First, Democrats on both sides should develop a coherent and comprehensive programme to ensure free and fair elections.
This includes concrete proposals for non-partisan districting, to prevent partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering, but also campaigns and legislation to minimise voter suppression.
Neither proposal should be partisan, even if Democrats have, at least in the short term, more to win from it.
Second, and related, Democrats have to come together on campaign finance reform.
Obviously, this is a divisive internal issue, with “Wall Street” Democrats profiting more from the current system.
But this advantage is primarily internal, ie in fighting off primary challengers, as the money floodgates opened by Citizens United primarily benefit Republicans candidates.
At the same time, within the Republican party, it has strengthened the hand of a small group of rather extreme donors, from free market zealots like the Koch brothers to supporters of the right-wing Israeli government like Sheldon Adelson. - Guardian News and Media
Stacey Abrams: identity politics
