US President Donald Trump’s professed change of mind about Syria and its President Bashar al-Assad – and his hints of possible punitive action in response to Tuesday’s chemical attack – have underlined his administration’s volatility on the world stage.
The suggestion that the US could intervene in the conflict would be a radical departure from the exclusively “America first” approach that has hitherto defined Trump’s policy. In Syria, that meant focusing exclusively on Islamic State and other extremists, and putting off dealing with the country’s political transition.
“I don’t like Assad at all,’’ Trump declared in a presidential debate last October. “But Assad is killing Isis. Russia is killing Isis and Iran is killing Isis.”
Only a few days ago, US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, declared: “Our priority is no longer to sit and focus on getting Assad out ”. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had argued the Syrian president’s future “will be decided by the Syrian people”, ignoring the fact that many of those people were under relentless bombardment by Assad and unable to voice an opinion.
Even more confounding was Trump’s declaration that the Idlib gas attack crossed “many, many lines – beyond a red line”. The comment came only hours after the president had lambasted former president Barack Obama for laying down the original red line on Assad’s use of chemical weapons in 2012 and then not attacking when the line was crossed in August 2013.
Trump has consistently argued that the failure to deliver on the “red line” threat projected US weakness. But it was far from clear on Wednesday what action his own administration would take now that Assad had crossed “many, many lines”.
But there were plenty of hints that the administration was at least considering a direct – possibly military – response. But any punitive strike would have to be backed up by consideration on what to do the day after, if Assad and Putin ignore the message. Increasing military aid to rebels would carry the same risk of falling into the hands of extremists.
Nor has any policymaker – left or right – ever credibly articulated a plan for Syria should the US succeed in toppling Assad, a strategic vacuum reminiscent of the disastrous Iraq occupation.
Moreover, any action against the Syrian regime would now also be against Russia.
The Idlib attack appears to have driven the first meaningful wedge between Trump and Putin. The shift in mood is clearly another consequence of the Idlib atrocity, but it is too early to say how lasting that shift will be and whether it could lead to the US and Russia clashing in the Syrian battlefield.
The policy implications for his change in attitude are far from clear. The president’s outlook could revert to its default mode once the images fade in his mind.
But it seems clear that Assad may have misjudged Trump. In November, the Syrian leader called him a “natural ally”, perhaps seeing in him a ruthless strongman like Putin and himself.
The reality now seems to be more complicated, emotional – and unpredictable.