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The complex interplay of global and regional interests in Afghanistan was explored at a recent meeting in London of the Institute of Islamic Strategic and Socio-Political Affairs (IISA). Participants met in a committee room in the House of Lords, Westminster, under the Chatham House rule which means speakers are afforded anonymity to promote free and open discussion. |
The focus was India, Pakistan, China and Iran and their respective relations with Afghanistan; speakers included academics and think-tank representatives specialising in these countries, security experts from Pakistan and diplomats.
With new lines of communication in the reconciliation process for Afghanistan being opened on several new fronts, governments with powerful vested interests in the beleaguered country are trying to determine what type of geo-political reality will emerge in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan next year.
India was described by a London based academic specialising in Asia-Pacific security as currently feeling “marginalised” and “cut out” as a stakeholder with significant investments in Afghanistan.
Despite assurances given to the Indian government by US Secretary of State John Kerry about its talks with the Taliban, the country, he maintained, remains uncertain about ambiguities in the reconciliation process. Uncertainties, he said, relate to figuring out “who is who” and about where the “red lines” are drawn. These doubts are also impacting upon India’s relations with Russia and Iran, he claimed.
Iran is important to India for energy security, countering the Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan, and for access to trade and transport connections with Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Hassan Rohani, the newly-elected president of Iran, it was noted, seems to be reassessing his country’s foreign policy and avoiding placing “all its eggs in one basket”. Of interest in this context was the visit last month to Iran by a delegation of senior Afghan Taliban who met with Iranian officials.
The invitation to the Taliban, it was suggested, could be seen as indicating that today Iran’s diplomacy is driven by pragmatism and not defined by Sunni/Shia religious politics.
A Washington-based professor of political science said that in terms of “soft” power, Iran has a stronger connection with Afghanistan than the US. There are many critical issues, he observed, which can only be resolved through close co-operation between Iran and Afghanistan: these include the management of shared water resources in the Helmand and Harirod-Murghat river basins, the control of drug trafficking along the shared border and the return of some 2mn Afghan refugees.
Given the wish for stability within Afghanistan as a start point for resolving these key issues, steps to repair the damaging rifts between Sunni and Shia are necessary. In fact, the professor said: “Trying to contain the Sunni-Shia rift is good for the whole region.”
Significantly, China has also engaged directly with the government of Afghanistan. Last September, as reported in the state-run Xinhua News Agency, China’s top security official, Zhou Yongkang, visited Afghanistan to meet with President Hamid Karzai. This was the first visit by a high-ranking Chinese political figure since 1966. At the meeting Zhou was reported by Xinhua as saying that China “will actively participate in Afghanistan’s reconstruction”.
A speaker from a British defence and security think tank noted that China’s interest in Afghanistan is largely related to its vision for developing the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the northwest of the country. Xinjiang, China’s largest administrative division, borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. It has extensive oil reserves and is China’s largest natural gas-producing region.
The speaker suggested that China was concerned that Pakistan might not be able to control the security situation. The Turkistan Islamic Party operates in China as well as in Central and South Asia, and is thought to have some fighters, albeit relatively small numbers estimated at 200, in Pakistan’s tribal areas and in Afghanistan.
China wants to create a prosperous region to develop trade with Xinjiang which is beset with ethnic tensions between the Muslim Uighurs and the Han Chinese. An unstable Afghanistan would jeopardise this plan.
Within Afghanistan, China’s interests include the Aynak copper mine project jointly owned by Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper and crude oil extraction. The China National Petroleum Corporation is engaged in the commercial production of crude oil in Afghanistan, which according to the Minister of Mines, Wahidullah Sharani, could transform the country’s economy over the next decade.
Afghanistan has mineral resources estimated to be worth $1tn. The country is a rich source of lithium which is used to make batteries for everything from mobile phones to iPads. Whether these resources can be successfully exploited to the benefit of all concerned parties depends heavily on the security situation in the country.
The role of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) was discussed with the view being expressed that it had on its hands both notable successes and failures in combating security threats. It was maintained that contrary to those who suggest otherwise, the ISI does not formulate policy – it follows policy and is one of several intelligence agencies.
However, it was recognised that it had become part of the political culture in Pakistan to keep the ISI “in the loop”. It was noted that the ISI would like to influence the Taliban and Haqqani networks which was not considered unusual in the context of what intelligence agencies do. There was an on-going debate about which leaders among the Taliban could “converge all interests”.
The violence suffered within Pakistan was said to be a threat to the nationhood of the country. The death toll since 2001, including military, police and civilians is estimated to be 49,000. The porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was feared, would become an asset to the Pakistani Taliban after the US withdrawal.
There was also a risk that the Afghani Taliban would not be able to control the Pakistani Taliban and that in-fighting between the two could erupt.
It was hoped that the Pakistan government could take a strong lead in bringing all security agencies together in a co-ordinated counter terrorism strategy. Also key to bringing peace to the region would be supporting Pakistan in building its democratic institutions and promoting structures that afforded accountability.
For Afghanistan, it was recognised that the solutions for a stable and secure country must be found within Afghanistan.