Qatar has a physical and geographic dependance on the maritime world. It only has one land border – with Saudi Arabia – and it is situated halfway along the western coast of the Arabian Gulf, which is defined as a closed or semi-enclosed sea under the UN law of the sea.
Qatar’s status as a maritime actor is linked to its rise as a global gas player during recent decades.It became the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2010. While it no longer holds that position it remains the world’s lowest cost producer of LNG. All of Qatar’s gas exports are delivered by sea. In 1996 it took possession of its first bespoke LNG tanker. As of January 2026, it was home to the world’s largest and most advanced LNG tanker fleet and had signed contracts to double fleet size by the early 2030s.
In recent years, Qatar has also developed extensively its non-energy related maritime sectors including commercial fleets, state-of-the-art port facilities, and maritime technology and sustainability programmes. These moves are intended to facilitate diversification out of energy by attracting inward investment that creates local jobs and generate non-hydrocarbon revenues.
This is part of a long-term strategy set out in 2008 in the Qatar 2030 National Vision (QNV2030) that focused on leveraging hydrocarbon resources to build a diversified knowledge-based economy. Fast forward to 2024, and the 3rd National Development Strategy (NDS3) has shifted its focus to specialist economic “clusters” to achieve non-hydrocarbon economic growth. One such cluster is focused on developing the port economy as a re-export hub in select high-value products.
In order to achieve these ambitious plans, Qatar is committed to a stable, functioning, maritime order based on international norms, laws and institutions. It has always prefered to settle maritime disputes at the International Cout of Justice (ICJ) or the International Maritime Organization (IMO), where Qatar currently serves a third consecutive term as an elected member of the IMO council. But the maritime domain is not only a source of gas or a transport route for LNG and non-hydrocarbon goods that needs the protection of the rules-based order. It is also a resource in itself that can be used to achieve national strategic objectives and, no less importantly, to get other regional and global actors to take Qatari interests into account before they act.
This worked well until the US-Israel-Iran conflict of 2026. During the blockade of Qatar between 2017 and 2021, energy connectivity through LNG exports was an important factor in Qatar’s successful avoidance of regional isolation. Its role in the maritime domain also allowed Qatar to demonstrate value to partners and customers and to present the country as a highly reliable, trustworthy provider of energy from a stable, hi-tech maritime base. Speaking in 2021, Qatar’s then minister of energy and industry, Dr Mohammad Bin Saleh al-Sada, explained that during the blockade, “We have never missed a single shipment of oil or gas... That shows how committed Qatar is, to our reliability”.
Qatar is not alone among small energy exporters in prioritising reliability in its energy narrative. Speaking in 2022 in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and rising Norwegian energy exports to Europe, the country’s energy minister Terje Aasland, made a similar statement to the one his Qatari counterpart made the previous year. “Norway”, he explained, “will remain a stable and predictable supplier of oil and gas through the energy transition.”
However, the “Earthquake” of 2026, as Qatar’s Prime Minsiter and Foreign Minister HE Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani, has described the Iran conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, has tested maritime actors all over the world. One consequence is that it has made it much harder for Qatar to use the energy-maritime nexus to build-up resilience at home or to extend its influence around the world.
In the wake of this conflict, Qatar will look to rebuild its energy and shipping connectivity, including its status as a highly reliable LNG exporter and a stable hi-tech re-export hub at the heart of the maritime domain. This may occur through increased investment in the port economy to make it even more competitive on both the regional and global levels. Such funds could come from the redirection of sovereign wealth back home, such as the recently announced Doha Investment platform which has set aside US$38.5bn in new infrastructure projects over five years.
In 2019, during the blockade, Qatar bought a majority share in Golden Pass, an LNG terminal and export facility located in Sabine Pass, Texas. One reason for this investment was to globalise Qatar’s energy business as a way to deliver LNG directly to clients around the world without relying on shipments from the Gulf. These moves may now speed up and expand. Given the current reduced levels of domestic LNG production and soaring shipping rates across the globe, we may also see Qatar convert parts of its large LNG tanker fleet into a global LNG shipping business with clients all over the world. We are seeing some signs of this in recent weeks with the offer for lease of a small number of LNG tankers
These and other strategies will ultimately assist the future of LNG exports and the ongoing evolution of Qatar’s ports into leading trans-shipment and re-export hubs. But they will also look to ensure that the energy-maritime nexus remains a key contributor to Qatar’s efforts to build resilience at home and influence abroad in the service of its national strategic and economic goals.
• The writer is a professor of International Politics and director of the Small States and Energy Studies Programs at Georgetown Univeristy in Qatar
@RoryDavidMiller