The upcoming state visit of South Korean President Lee Jae Myung to China marks a carefully choreographed moment in Asian geopolitics — one shaped as much by symbolism as by strategic necessity. While framed publicly as an effort to deepen economic co-operation, the visit reflects a far more complex recalibration by both Beijing and Seoul amid intensifying regional tensions, particularly involving Japan, the United States, and Taiwan.
At its core, China’s invitation to Lee appears to be a calculated diplomatic signal. Hosting the South Korean leader before his scheduled visit to Japan underscores Beijing’s desire to reassert influence over Seoul’s foreign policy trajectory. China seems intent on reminding South Korea that its economic future remains deeply intertwined with Beijing, even as security realities push Seoul closer to Washington and Tokyo. The unusually short interval between Xi and Lee’s meetings reinforces the impression that China is eager to lock in goodwill before regional alignments harden further.
From Beijing’s perspective, this outreach is defensive as much as diplomatic. Relations with Japan have deteriorated sharply, especially following remarks by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggesting Tokyo could intervene militarily in a Taiwan contingency. Against that backdrop, China is keen to avoid a consolidated trilateral front among the US, Japan, and South Korea. Strengthening ties with Seoul serves as a buffer against diplomatic isolation and complicates Washington’s efforts to present a unified regional bloc.
For South Korea, however, the visit reflects pragmatic balancing rather than ideological realignment. Lee’s administration has inherited a geopolitical landscape in which strategic autonomy is increasingly difficult. While the US-South Korea alliance remains foundational — particularly in deterring North Korea — China remains Seoul’s largest trading partner and a critical link in global supply chains. The economic realities are stark: China accounts for roughly a third of South Korea’s chip exports and supplies nearly half of its rare earth imports. Any abrupt deterioration in ties would carry immediate economic costs.
Lee’s remarks praising Xi Jinping as a “visionary leader” are therefore best understood less as ideological endorsement and more as diplomatic currency. Such language serves to create goodwill ahead of negotiations. Yet it also signals a shift in tone from the previous administration, which had been more openly critical of Beijing and closely aligned with Washington and Tokyo. Lee’s government appears intent on lowering friction, not redefining alliances.
That said, South Korea’s balancing act is increasingly precarious. The United States is moving toward a more flexible deployment of its forces in Korea, explicitly linking them to broader regional contingencies such as Taiwan. This development places Seoul in an uncomfortable position: while it benefits from US security guarantees, it risks becoming entangled in conflicts beyond the Korean Peninsula. China, unsurprisingly, views such shifts with suspicion, particularly as they intersect with Taiwan — a red line in Beijing’s strategic thinking.
Lee’s effort to reassure China that South Korea’s military modernisation, including nuclear-powered submarines, is aimed solely at deterring North Korea reflects this tightrope walk. Economically, the visit underscores mutual dependence rather than mutual trust. Cooperation on critical minerals, green industries, and supply chains is driven by necessity rather than shared vision. Both sides recognise vulnerabilities: South Korea fears over-reliance on Chinese inputs, while China wants to prevent supply chain decoupling led by the US. The agreement to stabilise rare earth supplies illustrates this uneasy pragmatism—co-operation born not of alignment, but of constraint.
North Korea adds another layer of complexity. Beijing remains Pyongyang’s most important ally, and Seoul hopes China can play a constructive mediating role. However, expectations should remain modest. China’s priority is stability, not denuclearisation, and its leverage over North Korea is often overstated. Still, Lee’s outreach suggests that even limited Chinese engagement is preferable to none, especially as Pyongyang grows more isolated and unpredictable.
Ultimately, this visit reflects a broader regional reality: East Asia is entering a period where middle powers like South Korea must constantly recalibrate, rather than choose sides outright. Lee’s approach suggests a strategy of hedging — maintaining the US alliance while easing tensions with China, even as Japan looms as both partner and rival.