Introduction

Leaders of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) will gather in Doha, Qatar, today ( December 5) for the GCC’s 44th Supreme Council Summit. The GCC Supreme Council meeting is held among the rulers of the GCC member states, and its hosting rotates among the member states annually. The Doha Summit is the first to be held outside Saudi Arabia since 2018 and the first to be hosted in Doha since the Al-Ula Declaration was signed in January 2021 between Qatar on one side and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the other, thus ending the three-year Gulf crisis.
While the GCC Summit in Doha is expected to consolidate Qatar’s rapprochement with the GCC after the Gulf crisis, it is most important that the summit showcases GCC members’ commitment to more substantial and cohesive regional co-operation. To this end, this year’s GCC Summit will likely involve discussion of deferred projects, which have been on hold because of the crisis. Yet, Gulf leaders must also brainstorm ways to coordinate efforts and overcome disagreements on political and strategic issues, especially regarding the ongoing war in Gaza. As Qatar prepares to host the 44th GCC Summit, the following sections delve into details regarding its challenges and opportunities.
Intra-Gulf relations between two summits
The last time Doha hosted the GCC Supreme Council meeting was in 2014 for the 35th summit, which took place under exceptional circumstances and within days of restoring diplomatic relations with Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
The unprecedented dispute and the tense regional atmosphere resulting from the Arab Spring dominated the agenda of the 35th meeting. It focused on the strategic challenges facing the region and entailed substantial discussions of Arab affairs, including fighting terrorism and restoring order to the Arab world after the Arab Spring and the unrest in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. Ultimately, the final communiqué reasserted GCC countries’ unified position on fighting terrorism and assured the “full support of the Egyptian government and people in achieving stability and prosperity.” The 35th Summit’s main achievement was to bring the member states together once more to discuss mutually important topics.
While progress of the GCC has historically been slow, GCC leaders may benefit from the stability established by the Al-Ula declaration. In fact, the Al-Ula Declaration is more profound in its implications than the Riyadh Supplementary Agreement of 2014. Since the declaration, various high-level meetings and visits took place across the Gulf, focusing on confidence-building and ways to improve bilateral ties, with some resulting in strategic bilateral dialogues. Most recently, Qatar and Bahrain announced that construction work would begin on the deferred Bahrain-Qatar Bridge.
In a broader context, GCC states are also witnessing a regional de-escalation, with Iran and Saudi Arabia agreeing to re-establish diplomatic relations earlier this year. At the same time, Saudi, Emirati, and Turkish relationships are also witnessing a breakthrough, with emergent signs of commitment to greater co-operation.
The change in the regional atmosphere will likely balance the GCC’s focus between its external and internal agendas. In principle, the GCC is likely to benefit from this new political atmosphere and to redirect its energy toward more intra-regional co-operation. Hence, the meeting is expected to deliver GCC-focused agenda outcomes by reviving deferred regional projects.

A promising agenda
Many media reports have indicated that a Pan-GCC visa is on the table for approval by Gulf leaders during the summit. GCC Secretary General Jassim al-Budaiwi first announced the Unified GCC Tourist Visa Project at the 40th meeting of Their Highnesses and Excellencies the Interior Ministers of the GCC. The announcement also indicated that the visa is expected to come into effect between 2024 and 2025 across the member states.
The proposed unified visa system for the region grants access to travelers under a single entry visa, streamlining the procedures for intra-regional mobility. The project is inspired by the application of the Hayya visa during the 2022 World Cup tournament 2022. The Hayya visa allowed visitors from across the region and the world to enter certain Gulf states and enjoy the tournament.
The project is likely to simplify travel logistics across the region and strengthen the tourism sector in the member states. The move is also projected to address the longstanding logistical hurdles to further economic co-operation among member states. Most importantly, it is considered a breakthrough, away from the competition between member states.

A challenging disagreement
Despite the promising agenda, disagreements remain. The war raging in Gaza since October 7 is likely to overshadow the summit. The unfolding humanitarian catastrophe, which has fundamentally divided the world between supporting Israel or Hamas, has much more profound implications for the GCC. For the last few years, the GCC member states were at odds over the normalisation of individual states’ ties with Israel, yet these disagreements remained passive and had no clear focus. However, the Gaza war brings this disagreement to the fore, forcing GCC leaders to reach a common agreement regarding their relationship with Israel, at least for the final communiqué.
More specifically, Qatar is leading international efforts toward a ceasefire in Gaza and has opened communication channels with Hamas and Israel. Qatar is seeking to strengthen its position as a reliable and strong mediator.
Still, there is international pressure from GCC allies and from the public for the member states to take a clear and unified position on the Gaza war.

Conclusion
The 44th Supreme Council Meeting to be hosted in Doha faces great pressure from the public to present a fresh agenda. Since the Gulf crisis, public lack of trust in the GCC has persisted. However, regional stability will likely inspire Gulf rulers to further establish intra-regional co-operation and to move forward with suspended projects.
*Published as part of Gulf Insights series by Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University

*This article has been redacted to suit the publisher's style and policies