Ottaway: There is a lot of frustration that this report isn’t out before the election.
By Denise Marray/Gulf Times London Correspondent
The chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee to which Sir John Chilcot will give evidence on February 4 on the preparation of his report into the 2003 Iraq war and on the obstacles which remain before he can submit it to the prime minister, is deeply frustrated by the long drawn-out process.
Sir Richard Ottaway, speaking to Gulf Times in the aftermath of Thursday’s House of Commons debate on the motion “That this House regrets that the Iraq Inquiry has decided to defer publication of its report until after 7 May 2015; and calls on the Inquiry to publish a timetable for publication and an explanation of the causes of the delay by 12 February 2015”, said that he hoped Chilcot could give a satisfactory explanation about the reasons for the delay in publishing the report which was officially launched on July 30, 2009.
Ottaway recalled how in 2004 he had questioned then-prime minister Tony Blair on the floor of the House of Commons about what he knew about Iraq’s weapons capability at the time of the crucial March 18, 2003 debate when Parliament voted on whether or not to go to war.
(At the conclusion of the debate, a motion backing the government’s position to go to war with Iraq was passed by 412 votes to 149)
Ottaway asked about the claim in a document titled Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, also known as the “September Dossier”, published by the British government on September 24, 2002, that Iraq could use weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of an order being given.
The official Hansard record of the February 4, 2004 Hutton Report debate records the exchange:
“Richard Ottaway (Croydon, South) (Con): The Prime Minister says that all the intelligence about the 45 minutes was made available. As he will be well aware, it has subsequently emerged that this related to battlefield weapons or small-calibre weaponry. In the eyes of many, if that information had been available, those weapons might not have been described as weapons of mass destruction threatening the region and the stability of the world. When did the Prime Minister know that information? In particular, did he know it when the House divided on 18 March?
The Prime Minister: No. I have already indicated exactly when this came to my attention. It was not before the debate on 18 March last year. The honourable Gentleman says that a battlefield weapon would not be a weapon of mass destruction, but if there were chemical, biological or nuclear battlefield weapons, they most certainly would be weapons of mass destruction. The idea that their use would not threaten the region’s stability I find somewhat eccentric.”
The 2003 Intelligence and Security Committee Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments report made the following observation about the September 24 dossier:
“The dossier was for public consumption and not for experienced readers of intelligence material. The 45 minutes claim, included four times, was always likely to attract attention because it was arresting detail that the public had not seen before.
“As the 45 minutes claim was new to its readers, the context of the intelligence and any assessment needed to be explained. The fact that it was assessed to refer to battlefield chemical and biological munitions and their movement on the battlefield, not to any other form of chemical or biological attack, should have been highlighted in the dossier.
“The omission of the context and assessment allowed speculation as to its exact meaning. This was unhelpful to an understanding of this issue.”
Ottaway observed: “The government had the benefit of information from the entire Intelligence services. What came out was that the weapons of mass destruction that we were going to remove because it was reported that they threatened the security of the world were in fact battlefield weapons – in other words they were defensive rather than offensive weapons – they were not strategic – that is at the heart of the complaint.
“I asked Tony Blair if he knew that when he made his speech to the House of Commons before we voted to go to war and he said that he did not know this at that time.
“He said to me on the floor of the House that he didn’t know that and I leave it to others to make a judgment as to whether or not they believe him.
“I haven’t seen the intelligence but two inquiries in 2003 and 2004 have said that the intelligence was that they were battlefield weapons. This is all in the public domain.”
He concluded: “Of the four inquiries that we have had so far, none of them had completely unlimited access to all the information, and the most likely thing to come out of the Chilcot inquiry is the motive for going to war.
“There is a lot of frustration that this report isn’t out before the election; this was a political decision to go to war, and the way the public pass judgment on political decisions is at General Elections and so it would be thoroughly appropriate that if it was available it should be got out now. But it isn’t available.
“What I want Sir John to do is to explain why there is a delay.”
