President
Emmanuel Macron’s election in France and the likely continuation of
Angela Merkel’s chancellorship in Germany are dramatically at odds with
developments in the rest of Europe, which has become increasingly
unstable and unpredictable. One wonders if the European Union’s hard
Franco-German core is becoming too hard for the rest of the bloc. If so,
those who dream of “ever closer” European integration may have to
settle for a modestly enlarged Franco-German axis.
Europe today is
being torn apart by centrifugal forces, including Catalonia’s
secessionist movement and the more muted push for autonomy in the
Italian regions of Lombardy and Veneto. Right-wing populism is in power
in Hungary and Poland, and may now be resurgent in Austria, too.
Left-wing populists govern in Greece, and centrist populism seems to be
coming to the Czech Republic, where the mogul Andrej Babis is on track
to be the country’s next prime minister.
Obviously, the EU is
producing a bitter backlash from voters across the political spectrum,
as the name of Babis’s triumphant party, “Action of Dissatisfied
Citizens,” would suggest. But what is not obvious is the root cause of
that dissatisfaction.
It is often said that populism is an inevitable
response from globalisation’s victims. But this claim is belied by
strong economic performance in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
And it doesn’t explain why the Catalan crisis erupted just as Spain was
staging a strong economic recovery, or why Greece remains vulnerable.
Meanwhile, another favourite culprit, refugee inflows, has a compelling
alibi: there are actually very few asylum-seekers in the countries
spearheading attacks on the EU’s migration policies.
To identify the
root of European discontent, we need to examine the long-held
expectation that leadership in Europe must always come from the
Franco-German partnership, which was the primary driver of European
integration for decades. In the post-war period, French President
Charles de Gaulle worked closely with West German Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer, and this carried through until the 1990s, when Francois
Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl forged a close friendship.
Owing to this
history, it was long assumed that if France and Germany agree on
something, the rest of Europe should simply fall into line. But during
the eurozone debt crisis, which began in late 2009, power started to
shift away from France, and toward Germany, and many in Europe began to
regard both as bullies. In opinion surveys, French and Germans now rank
low in other Europeans’ assessments of trustworthiness.
Merkel, to be
sure, has been polarising. Before September 2015, many Europeans
believed her to be too devoted to an austerity regime that had
intensified the euro crisis. Then, she led Europe’s humanitarian
response to the refugee crisis, earning praise from former critics but
condemnation by populists and other anti-EU nationalists, particularly
in the United Kingdom, France, and Central Europe. Now, populists blame
her for not just refugees, but for terrorism, too.
Similarly, Macron
has not done himself any favours in Central and Eastern Europe. His
criticism of the Posted Workers Directive – which allows workers from
the region to undercut Western European wages and avoid payroll taxes –
has made him as much a villain as Merkel in some countries.
During
the euro crisis, many Greek, Italian, and Spanish politicians saw France
as a counterweight to Germany. They thought that France could temper
Germany’s austerity push and advocate for higher public-sector
investments. But this was an illusion, and a misreading of France’s role
in the Franco-German partnership. According to the traditional division
of labour, France provides security and the means for Europe to project
power abroad; and Germany oversees finance and economics at home.
When
Europe was confronted with a security challenge after Russia’s 2014
annexation of Crimea, the Franco-German engine ran rather efficiently.
But the EU’s critics do not like the idea of coordinated foreign
policies any more than they liked the idea of fiscal and monetary
discipline being imposed in the middle of a recession.
Still, even as
the Franco-German partnership has drawn fire, it has also gained
salience, owing to the UK’s decision to leave the EU. Before the 2016
Brexit referendum, many on the EU’s periphery saw the UK as a barrier to
French dirigisme and German power grabs. Now, the UK is at the mercy of
Germany and France as it negotiates its exit.
The press photographs
of British Prime Minister Theresa May’s visit to Brussels on October 20
were telling, because they recalled the moment when, at an EU summit in
November 2011, Merkel and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy rolled
their eyes at Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Within a couple
of weeks, Berlusconi was out of government.
Looking forward, France
and Germany urgently need to develop a shared vision that transcends
their own national politics and embraces genuine EU-level reform. There
is already some agreement on the need for defence co-ordination and tax
harmonisation. But that is not enough. France and Germany still need to
address many questions with respect to fiscal centralisation,
sovereign-debt restructuring, and other fundamental issues.
And
regardless of whether France and Germany agree on any given issue, all
policy areas need to be opened up to a bargaining process that includes
all other EU member-states. The rest of Europe needs to feel as though
it has a seat at the table. This could be accomplished with EU-level
candidate lists for the European Parliament, as Macron recently
proposed; or with formal mechanisms to engage Europe’s regions and
cities, so that the European Council is not reserved exclusively for
member states.
Ultimately, the EU can still develop, but only if it
frees itself from narrow French and German priorities. What Europe needs
now is not a hard core, but a hard think. - Project Syndicate
* Harold James is professor of History and International Affairs at
Princeton University and a senior fellow at the Centre for International
Governance Innovation.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel with President Emmanuel Macron. Leadership in Europe has always come from the Franco-German partnership.