Iraq’s victory over the Islamic State group in Tal Afar was the latest in a string of gains against the militant group, but Iraqi forces still face massive challenges.
In 2014, as IS staged a rapid advance across northern Iraq, police and military personnel abandoned their posts to the militants with barely a fight.
That allowed the group to establish its “caliphate” across parts of Syria and a third of Iraq’s territory including second city Mosul.
Today, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who took office three months after the 2014 military debacle, says the Iraqi state is back, stronger and better organised.
Under the premier’s command and backed by a US-led multinational coalition, Iraqi forces have retaken Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah and in July, after a gruelling nine-month battle, Mosul.
On Thursday, Abadi announced the recapture of the town of Tal Afar and surrounding areas, bringing the whole of Nineveh province, of which Mosul is the capital, under government control.
“Our battle plans are now being taught in military academies, including tactics for urban guerrilla warfare and demining,” said interior ministry spokesman Brigadier General Saad Maan.
The fight would have challenged almost any army in the world. The fact that the Iraqis could do it has given their security forces additional confidence. They have shown themselves to be capable to manoeuvre against IS in all locations in Iraq.
During the fight for Mosul, described by an American general in Baghdad as “the toughest urban battle since World War II”, Iraqi troops suffered heavy losses.
But they have now forced IS out of all its Iraqi territories except the town of Hawija, 300km north of Baghdad, and a few pockets of territory near the border with Syria.
In doing so, they have repaired some of the damage done three years ago and regained the confidence of their fellow citizens and internationally.
Iraqi-led decision-making and better sharing of intelligence between Baghdad and the US-led coalition have allowed for quicker, more targeted attacks.
But Iraq’s Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari warned on August 26 that “victory in Iraq will not mean an end to the danger posed by IS”.
He said Iraq would continue its military co-operation with the coalition, saying it needed “preventive security” against “terrorist cells working in the shadows”.
Hanoun said IS would likely go back to its “original mode of operation”, attacking targets such as residential districts and markets.
But a lack of co-ordination and organisation means the security services struggle to cope with such attacks.
The question of whether and how the coalition will continue to operate in Iraq is a hot political topic both for Baghdad and for Washington, which in 2011 finally withdrew its troops eight years after leading an invasion of the country.
Abadi’s co-operation with the US poses a pressing dilemma: what will become of the Hashed al-Shaabi paramilitary coalition, key to the fight against IS but dominated by Shia militias?
Most Shia leaders call for the Hashed, currently under the command of the prime minister, to remain in its current form.
But paramilitary groups have played a problematic role in Iraqi politics as far back as the 1930s. The Hashed’s existence was an admission of the failure of an army trained by US administrations at great financial and material cost over 14 years.
Alleged abuses both by government and Hashed fighters battling IS will complicate efforts to regain the confidence of Iraq’s Sunni minority, marginalised and out of power since the 2003 fall of dictator Saddam Hussein.
On top of the sectarian question, Iraq faces another challenge to its national unity: a referendum on independence for its autonomous Kurdish region, set for September 25.
The US and coalition members are strongly opposed to the poll, saying it could distract from the fight against IS.
Baghdad is also set to hold provincial and parliamentary elections in spring 2018, posing a test for Abadi.
The premier has made the success of the military campaign a selling point as a way to prove his ‘reforms’ are working.
But Abadi’s campaign could suffer from low oil prices, which have hit the Iraqi state’s coffers hard.
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