Europe’s hard-core problem

PresidentEmmanuel Macron’s election in France and the likely continuation ofAngela Merkel’s chancellorship in Germany are dramatically at odds withdevelopments in the rest of Europe, which has become increasinglyunstable and unpredictable. One wonders if the European Union’s hardFranco-German core is becoming too hard for the rest of the bloc. If so,those who dream of “ever closer” European integration may have tosettle for a modestly enlarged Franco-German axis.Europe today isbeing torn apart by centrifugal forces, including Catalonia’ssecessionist movement and the more muted push for autonomy in theItalian regions of Lombardy and Veneto. Right-wing populism is in powerin Hungary and Poland, and may now be resurgent in Austria, too.Left-wing populists govern in Greece, and centrist populism seems to becoming to the Czech Republic, where the mogul Andrej Babis is on trackto be the country’s next prime minister.Obviously, the EU isproducing a bitter backlash from voters across the political spectrum,as the name of Babis’s triumphant party, “Action of DissatisfiedCitizens,” would suggest. But what is not obvious is the root cause ofthat dissatisfaction.It is often said that populism is an inevitableresponse from globalisation’s victims. But this claim is belied bystrong economic performance in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.And it doesn’t explain why the Catalan crisis erupted just as Spain wasstaging a strong economic recovery, or why Greece remains vulnerable.Meanwhile, another favourite culprit, refugee inflows, has a compellingalibi: there are actually very few asylum-seekers in the countriesspearheading attacks on the EU’s migration policies.To identify theroot of European discontent, we need to examine the long-heldexpectation that leadership in Europe must always come from theFranco-German partnership, which was the primary driver of Europeanintegration for decades. In the post-war period, French PresidentCharles de Gaulle worked closely with West German Chancellor KonradAdenauer, and this carried through until the 1990s, when FrancoisMitterrand and Helmut Kohl forged a close friendship.Owing to thishistory, it was long assumed that if France and Germany agree onsomething, the rest of Europe should simply fall into line. But duringthe eurozone debt crisis, which began in late 2009, power started toshift away from France, and toward Germany, and many in Europe began toregard both as bullies. In opinion surveys, French and Germans now ranklow in other Europeans’ assessments of trustworthiness.Merkel, to besure, has been polarising. Before September 2015, many Europeansbelieved her to be too devoted to an austerity regime that hadintensified the euro crisis. Then, she led Europe’s humanitarianresponse to the refugee crisis, earning praise from former critics butcondemnation by populists and other anti-EU nationalists, particularlyin the United Kingdom, France, and Central Europe. Now, populists blameher for not just refugees, but for terrorism, too.Similarly, Macronhas not done himself any favours in Central and Eastern Europe. Hiscriticism of the Posted Workers Directive – which allows workers fromthe region to undercut Western European wages and avoid payroll taxes –has made him as much a villain as Merkel in some countries.Duringthe euro crisis, many Greek, Italian, and Spanish politicians saw Franceas a counterweight to Germany. They thought that France could temperGermany’s austerity push and advocate for higher public-sectorinvestments. But this was an illusion, and a misreading of France’s rolein the Franco-German partnership. According to the traditional divisionof labour, France provides security and the means for Europe to projectpower abroad; and Germany oversees finance and economics at home.WhenEurope was confronted with a security challenge after Russia’s 2014annexation of Crimea, the Franco-German engine ran rather efficiently.But the EU’s critics do not like the idea of coordinated foreignpolicies any more than they liked the idea of fiscal and monetarydiscipline being imposed in the middle of a recession.Still, even asthe Franco-German partnership has drawn fire, it has also gainedsalience, owing to the UK’s decision to leave the EU. Before the 2016Brexit referendum, many on the EU’s periphery saw the UK as a barrier toFrench dirigisme and German power grabs. Now, the UK is at the mercy ofGermany and France as it negotiates its exit.The press photographsof British Prime Minister Theresa May’s visit to Brussels on October 20were telling, because they recalled the moment when, at an EU summit inNovember 2011, Merkel and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy rolledtheir eyes at Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Within a coupleof weeks, Berlusconi was out of government.Looking forward, Franceand Germany urgently need to develop a shared vision that transcendstheir own national politics and embraces genuine EU-level reform. Thereis already some agreement on the need for defence co-ordination and taxharmonisation. But that is not enough. France and Germany still need toaddress many questions with respect to fiscal centralisation,sovereign-debt restructuring, and other fundamental issues.Andregardless of whether France and Germany agree on any given issue, allpolicy areas need to be opened up to a bargaining process that includesall other EU member-states. The rest of Europe needs to feel as thoughit has a seat at the table. This could be accomplished with EU-levelcandidate lists for the European Parliament, as Macron recentlyproposed; or with formal mechanisms to engage Europe’s regions andcities, so that the European Council is not reserved exclusively formember states.Ultimately, the EU can still develop, but only if itfrees itself from narrow French and German priorities. What Europe needsnow is not a hard core, but a hard think. - Project Syndicate* Harold James is professor of History and International Affairs atPrinceton University and a senior fellow at the Centre for InternationalGovernance Innovation.